ASTRA

Consensus-Labeled Prompt Bank for Measuring Coding-Model Compliance with Malicious-Code Requests

This paper introduces a large, consensus-labeled benchmark of 6,675 prompts drawn from eight existing corpora (ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) to evaluate whether coding-specialized LLMs refuse malicious requests. A key contribution is the distinction between requests for executable malicious code (4,748 prompts) versus harmful security knowledge (1,923 prompts), arguing that coding models should face a stricter refusal standard given their outputs can be directly weaponized. A five-judge consensus protocol achieves Fleiss' kappa of 0.767, providing a reliability-quantified substrate for cross-corpus compliance measurement that the field has previously lacked.