6arXiv cs.AI (Artificial Intelligence)·
Framework for penetration testing AI-enabled systems via behavioral objective violation
A new arXiv preprint proposes reframing penetration testing for AI-enabled systems beyond traditional infrastructure compromise to include adversarial behavioral influence. The authors define 'AI-enabled penetration' as inducing AI-governed behavior that violates operational objectives, covering attack surfaces such as prompt injection, data poisoning, retrieval poisoning, tool misuse, and agentic misalignment. A structured testing workflow and a running example using an AI security operations center assistant illustrate the framework. The work addresses a gap in security evaluation methodology as agentic AI systems become more widely deployed.
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