AgentSnare is a new defensive system that dynamically constructs decoy environments to mislead autonomous LLM penetration testing agents, adapting in real time to the agent's interaction history rather than relying on static artifacts. Evaluated across 15 CVE-Bench web applications and three attacker models, it absorbs 46.8% of tool calls in the decoy, retains 55.9% of post-entry actions there, and prevents successful exploitation of any real target across all 45 attacker-CVE pairs at pass@3. The work addresses a meaningful gap in AI security: as LLM agents become capable enough to bypass static honeypots, adaptive deception becomes necessary for defense.
Researchers introduce ANTAP (Automatic Non-Textual Agent Picker), a routing architecture for multi-agent LLM systems that replaces text-based agent self-descriptions with empirical capability testing and algebraic projection in a shared semantic space. The approach creates a 'linguistic firewall' that makes metadata-based injection attacks inexpressible at inference time. Against description-based injection attacks, ANTAP achieves near-zero attack success rate compared to 67.3%+ for baseline routers, and reduces embedding-based attack success by 20%.
Researchers demonstrate the first known distributed agent attack, a multi-agent scaffold that splits harmful cybersecurity tasks across many user accounts to evade per-transcript safety monitors, reducing detection rates to roughly one-fifth of standard attacks. As a defense, they develop a stateful online monitor that clusters weak suspiciousness signals across many agent transcripts in real time, escalating only rarely to a full LM-based review. In large-scale simulated datacenter traffic evaluations, the monitor Pareto-dominates standard monitors by catching distributed attacks 30% earlier with negligible latency overhead for ~99% of traffic. The system also incidentally catches standard jailbreaks, since adaptive attackers tend to reuse attack variants across accounts.
A new arXiv preprint introduces the Agent-Native Immune System (ANIS), a defense architecture embedded within an agent's cognitive loop rather than applied externally at training time or perimeter. The framework proposes a six-layer Immune Tower, a taxonomy of Agent Viruses and Agent Vaccines distinguishing parametric from non-parametric defenses, and a self-monitoring Harness Triad enabling Continual Immune Learning. The paper draws a formal distinction between static training-time alignment and dynamic runtime immunity, arguing current defenses leave agents vulnerable to memory poisoning, tool-chain manipulation, and multi-agent protocol attacks.
Researchers propose a Policy Learning Technique using imitation learning to infer attacker (red agent) policies from network observations and defender actions in partially observable autonomous cyber environments. The method integrates with neurosymbolic cyber-defense agents that use behavior trees with learning-enabled components. Evaluated across diverse simulated scenarios, the approach achieves high prediction accuracy for red agent actions, improving the defender's ability to anticipate intrusions.
A new arXiv preprint proposes reframing penetration testing for AI-enabled systems beyond traditional infrastructure compromise to include adversarial behavioral influence. The authors define 'AI-enabled penetration' as inducing AI-governed behavior that violates operational objectives, covering attack surfaces such as prompt injection, data poisoning, retrieval poisoning, tool misuse, and agentic misalignment. A structured testing workflow and a running example using an AI security operations center assistant illustrate the framework. The work addresses a gap in security evaluation methodology as agentic AI systems become more widely deployed.
Researchers introduce RedAct, a framework for releasing agent execution traces without exposing proprietary procedural skills (tool invocations, decision logic, error-recovery strategies). The system localizes sensitive information, rewrites traces while preserving audit-critical evidence, and embeds behavioral watermarks for provenance tracking. To evaluate the approach, the authors construct CapTraceBench, a benchmark of 75 long-horizon tasks and 154 skills across seven domains. RedAct reduces normalized skill transfer from 44.7–67.1% on raw traces to below the no-skill baseline, while watermark detection achieves 93.6–100% true positive rate with under 2% false alarms.
ServiceNow AI has released AprielGuard, a guardrail system designed to improve safety and adversarial robustness in LLM deployments. The system targets prompt injection, jailbreaks, and other adversarial inputs that bypass standard safety measures. It is presented as a component for enterprise LLM pipelines seeking more robust content moderation and safety filtering.
PentestAgent is an open-source Python framework that applies AI agent techniques to penetration testing, bug bounty, and red-team workflows. The project has accumulated 2,497 GitHub stars with modest daily traction (+30). It represents a practical deployment of autonomous agent architectures in offensive security contexts.