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5arXiv cs.CL (Computation and Language)·3d ago

Study of security and privacy prompts in the wild reveals LLM response quality gaps and inconsistency

Researchers analyzed 14,727 security and privacy (S&P) prompts drawn from WildChat's 3.2M real user-LLM conversations, categorizing them into nine topic areas and evaluating response quality across 270 advice-seeking prompts. Commercial models substantially outperformed open-weight models (GPT achieving 98% 'good enough' responses vs. Llama 4 at 47%), but even high-performing commercial models showed inconsistent responses across repeated runs of the same prompt. The study is the first to analyze real user S&P queries to LLMs rather than expert-authored test sets, surfacing both a capability gap and a reliability concern.

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5arXiv · cs.CL·12d ago·source ↗

Systematic evaluation of LLM prompt sensitivity in healthcare settings reveals safety risks

Researchers conduct a sensitivity analysis of both general-purpose and medical-specific LLMs using the MedMCQA benchmark, testing robustness to lexical and syntactic prompt perturbations. The study finds that even minor phrasing changes can alter clinical advice, and adversarial prompts can produce dangerous outputs such as incorrect dosages or omitted critical findings. Both general-purpose models (GPT-3.5, Llama 3) and domain-specific models (ClinicalBERT, BioLlama3, BioBERT) exhibit this fragility, with syntactic reordering and misleading contextual cues proving more destabilizing than simple paraphrasing.

5arXiv · cs.CL·18d ago·source ↗

Systematic Evaluation of LLM Safety Failures on Eating Disorder Queries with Clinician Feedback

This paper investigates how LLMs respond to queries from users with eating disorders, finding that specific linguistic cues in prompts increase the likelihood of unsafe model responses. Working with clinical ED experts, the authors systematically vary risk levels in user prompts to measure the extent to which LLMs uncritically adapt to potentially dangerous inputs. The study highlights a gap between perceived model safety and actual harm facilitation in sensitive health contexts.

5Hacker News·16d ago·source ↗

Practitioner spends $1,500 testing LLM offensive security capabilities against a purpose-built vulnerable app

A developer built a deliberately vulnerable application and ran LLMs against it as automated penetration testers, spending $1,500 on API costs across the experiment. The post evaluates how well current LLMs can identify and exploit real vulnerabilities in a controlled setting. Results provide practical signal on the current state of LLM-assisted offensive security, a capability area with both red-team and safety implications.

6arXiv · cs.AI·10d ago·source ↗

Paper challenges LLM expert-level claims by measuring variance and error magnitude in code-based data analysis tasks

A new arXiv paper argues that standard LLM benchmarks overstate model capabilities by focusing on average performance on training-data-adjacent tasks while ignoring response variance and error magnitude. The authors introduce a novel benchmark requiring frontier LLMs to write code for data analysis tasks, comparing results against human expert submissions. Human experts outperformed the frontier LLM on average across multiple metrics and showed lower performance variability. The findings challenge the prevailing narrative that LLMs perform at human-expert level on knowledge economy tasks.

7arXiv · cs.CL·46h ago·source ↗

LLM psychological profiles are largely measurement artifacts, not model properties

A new arXiv preprint administers a battery of personality and risk-preference instruments to 56 instruction-tuned LLMs alongside large human reference samples, finding that 81-90% of between-model variation is explained by directional response bias rather than the traits the instruments target. The authors introduce the concept of 'response orthogonality' to explain why some instruments appear more reliable than others, and show that apparent psychological profiles can be manufactured through item selection. The findings challenge the validity of using human-designed psychometric tools to characterize LLMs, with direct implications for safety assessment and the use of LLMs as proxies for human participants in research.

7arXiv · cs.CL·9d ago·source ↗

MedMisBench: LLMs show fragile epistemic resilience under misleading medical context

Researchers introduce MedMisBench, a benchmark of 10,932 medical questions paired with 48,889 misleading context injections, to measure whether LLMs maintain correct medical judgment under adversarial pressure. Across 11 model configurations, mean accuracy drops from 71.1% to 38.0% when misleading context is injected, with authority-framed falsehoods achieving 69.5% attack success. A 14-member international clinical panel flagged serious potential harm in 38.2% of reviewed cases. The work argues that existing medical benchmarks measure knowledge but not robustness to manipulation, exposing a structural gap in LLM safety evaluation for healthcare.

4arXiv · cs.CL·5d ago·source ↗

LoSoNA benchmark evaluates LLM adaptation to implicit local social norms in group chats

Researchers introduce LoSoNA, a benchmark for testing whether LLM-based agents can infer and adapt to unstated local conversational norms in multi-party chat scenarios. Each scenario presents a group-chat transcript where non-subject participants implicitly demonstrate a hidden norm, followed by an elicitor turn. Eight frontier and open-weight models are evaluated under four prompting conditions; naive prompting performs poorly for most models, while explicit norm-aware prompting yields uneven gains—Gemini 3.1 Pro reaches 84.2% and Claude Fable 5 reaches 81.6%. The work contributes to growing interest in evaluating LLM social and pragmatic capabilities beyond factual or reasoning tasks.

6arXiv · cs.CL·23d ago·source ↗

Consensus-Labeled Prompt Bank for Measuring Coding-Model Compliance with Malicious-Code Requests

This paper introduces a large, consensus-labeled benchmark of 6,675 prompts drawn from eight existing corpora (ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) to evaluate whether coding-specialized LLMs refuse malicious requests. A key contribution is the distinction between requests for executable malicious code (4,748 prompts) versus harmful security knowledge (1,923 prompts), arguing that coding models should face a stricter refusal standard given their outputs can be directly weaponized. A five-judge consensus protocol achieves Fleiss' kappa of 0.767, providing a reliability-quantified substrate for cross-corpus compliance measurement that the field has previously lacked.